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JUST A CLEAN BLUE FLAME?
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN THE
BARNETT SHALE
Hal R. Ray, Jr.t
I.

INTRODUcTION: How CLEAN IS

THE BLUE FLAME?

Like the prospectors scouring the hills for gold in "The Treasure of
the Sierra Madre," the old-time Fort Worth oil and gas operators
never suspected that the mother of all lodes was right under their feet.
Through the happy coincidence of price increase and technological
advancement, however, significant deposits of clean-burning natural
gas were located in and around Fort Worth, brought to the surface,
gathered into pipelines, and sent on to the burners. Almost overnight,
people who grew up dreaming of the gusher at Spindletop and the
derrick-filled lots in Kilgore found themselves sharing their streets
with tank trucks hauling saltwater waste and pick-ups bearing the
logos of the newest barons of the Barnett Shale gas boom. The clean
blue flame of relatively accessible, economical, and environmentally
friendly natural gas brought a return to the oil patch for Fort Worth
and many other cities located near shale deposits. Development of
the Barnett Shale also illuminated conflicts that arise when twentyfirst century urban life intersects with oil and gas exploration and production. The flame was clean and blue for the ultimate customer, but
getting it to that point was neither easy for the gas producer nor free
of hazard to surrounding persons or property.
This paper addresses current environmental law issues affecting the
Barnett Shale and the businesses and people who are impacted by
development activities in the play. It will look first at recent scientific
studies suggesting that production of natural gas in the Dallas-Fort
Worth Metroplex may have a greater impact on the region's air pollution challenges than previously thought. The article next examines air
permitting requirements relating to gas production equipment and facilities. The article discusses oil and gas disposal wells and recent
cases examining regulatory issues affecting permits for these wells. Finally, the paper spotlights two common law causes of action asserted
in cases between landowners and companies engaged in activities related to the Barnett Shale and the impact of administrative jurisdiction on common law claims.

t Mr. Ray is a partner in Pope, Hardwicke, Christie, Schell, Kelly & Ray, L.L.P.,
Fort Worth, Texas.
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SCIENTIFIC DEBATE VERSUS LEGAL REALITIES: CAUSES AND

EFFECTS OF GAS PRODUCTION AND AIR POLLUTION

As if Ozone Action Days, Air Pollution Warnings, and concerns
about even warmer global weather did not already cause enough worries for city dwellers, a dispute arose in early 2009 concerning the effect of oil and gas drilling, completion, and production in the Barnett
Shale on air quality in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex (DFW) and
surrounding counties. Like all good battles in environmental law, the
two sides of the debate armed themselves with well-qualified experts.
Critics concerned with the impact of oil and gas activities on DFW air
pollution relied on a recent study published by Al Armendariz, Ph.D.,
a research associate professor in the Department of Environmental
and Civil Engineering at Southern Methodist University, which was
commissioned by the Environmental Defense Fund.' More skeptical
observers of potential air impacts took comfort in the rebuttal to the
Armendariz report generated by Al Ireland, Ph.D., Executive Director of the Barnett Shale Energy Education Council (BSEEC). The
BSEEC bills itself as a "community resource that provides information to the public about gas drilling and production in the Barnett
Shale region in North Texas." 2
Released to the public on January 23, 2009, the Armendariz report
generated quite a stir in local environmental and industry circles primarily because of its conclusion that "[e]missions of NOx [nitrous oxide] and VOC [volatile organic compounds] in the summer of 2009
from all oil and gas sources in the Barnett Shale 21-county area will
exceed emissions from on-road mobile sources in the D-FW metropolitan area by more than 30 tons per day (tpd) (307 vs. 273 tpd)." 3 The
report also concluded that emissions of NOx and VOC from Barnett
Shale compressor engines or condensate tanks alone would amount to
many times the anticipated emissions of similar compounds by all of
the airports in the DFW Metroplex.4 Less publicized, but potentially
more important to air quality than the report's conclusions, were Professor Armendariz's proposed changes to drilling, completion, and
production methods: (1) extend the limitations on NOx production by
engines that exceed fifty horsepower to all of the counties in the Barnett Shale, not just the nine DFW Metro counties; (2) use electric motors, not gas power or other internal combustion engines, to run
1. AL ARMENDARIZ, EMISSIONS FROM NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION IN THE BARNETT SHALE AREA AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR COST-EFFECTIVE IMPROVEMENTS, avail-

able at http://www.edf.org/documents/9235 BarnettShaleReport.pdf. While the
Texas Commission of Environmental Quality has not taken a formal position on the
Armendariz study, it has issued informal guidance to the media which is available
through the TCEQ.
2. Barnett Shale Energy Education Council, About BSEEC, http://www.bseec.
org/index.php/content/about/bseec/ (last visited July 7, 2009).
3. ARMENDARIZ, supra note 1, at 25.
4. Id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol16/iss1/9
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V16.I1.7

2

Ray: Just a Clean Blue Flame? Environmental Issues in the Barnett Shal

2009]

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN BARNETT SHALE

81

compressors; (3) employ vapor recovery units on oil and condensate
tanks; (4) use enclosed flares on tanks; (5) employ so-called green well
completion technologies; (6) implement advanced leak detection and
repair procedures for production wells, processing, and transmission
facilities; and (7) eliminate gas-actuated pneumatic devices.5
In response to the Armendariz report, the BSEEC released a brief,
but substantive, rebuttal of the conclusions and methodology of the
study.6 While agreeing that oil and gas activities in the Barnett Shale
impact air quality, the BSEEC rejected the Armendariz report's conclusion that those impacts exceed the total of mobile sources and airports combined. The primary thrust of the criticism was that the
impact of Barnett Shale oil and gas activities must not have contributed as much to air pollution as Armendariz suggested because eighthour ozone levels in the nine-county DFW non-attainment area decreased since 2000 just as the number of Barnett Shale wells drilled in
those counties dramatically increased year over year. 7 The BSEEC
suggested that the Armendariz report overstated its conclusions because of three fatal errors.8 First, the report assumed that Barnett
Shale wells produced more condensate than they actually did.9 Second, it assumed that condensate-producing wells produced the same
amount of VOCs per barrel of condensate regardless of pressure, and
it overstated the effect of hot weather on VOC production.'" Third,
wind pattern data suggested that any impact on ozone levels from oil
and gas activities in the western counties of the Barnett Shale, such as
Denton, Wise, and Parker, would be minimal since the prevailing
wind patterns would be expected to carry emissions away from, not
toward, the heart of the DFW Metroplex."
Setting aside personal or client-driven allegiance to one of the battle lines, it seems clear that oil and gas activities in the Barnett Shale
affect air quality in the local region and must be included in any plans
to address air pollution in North Texas. Supplemental data submitted
by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to Region VI of the Environmental Protection Agency concerning the Dallas-Fort Worth Eight Hour Ozone State Implementation Plan confirm
that emissions from compressors in the Barnett Shale are not an inconsequential potential source of ozone in the Metroplex. 2 The im5. Id. at 28-36.
6. Ed Ireland, Air Quality and the Barnett Shale, Barnett Shale Energy Education Council (2009), http://www.bseec.org/index.php/content/news detaillair_qualityand the barnett shale/.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Letter from Susana M. Hildebrand, P.E., Dir., Air Quality Div., Tex.
Comm'n on Envtl. Quality to Thomas Diggs, Assoc. Div. Dir. for Air Programs,
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plementation of the new 50 horsepower engine emission limits should
address at least some of the concerns for emissions coming from compressor installations. Finally, the suggestions for modification of Barnett Shale gas facilities contained in the Armendariz report and
elsewhere should also contribute to a reduction in emissions or at least
slow the rate of growth in emissions that are linked to gas production
in and near the DFW Metroplex area. The ultimate winner of the
scientific battle between gas production critics and supporters is yet to
be determined, but the issues relating to air pollution raised by the
Armendariz report and responses such as those made by the BSEEC
will continue to impact activities in the Barnett Shale for years to
come.
III.

You

HAVE TO HAVE A PERMIT:

REGULATORY CONTROLS ON

SOURCES OF AIR POLLUTION FROM GAS FACILITIES

Although owners of new oil and gas facilities potentially impacting
air quality always have the option of applying for a regular permit
from the TCEQ, owners of such facilities generally seek an alternative
path to regulatory compliance, either through a standard permit, a
flexible permit, a permit by rule, or exemption from permitting due to
the source or facility being classified as "de minimis."' 3 A standard
permit, as it relates to oil and gas, is one issued by the agency for a
particular purpose.1 4 A flexible permit allows for changes to be made
at a facility without the necessity of obtaining a new permit, if the
requirements of the regulation are met.15 De minimis sources and facilities are governed by chapter 30, section 116.119 of the Texas Administrative Code and include facilities listed on the de minimis list
and those that meet the requirements of the de minimis rule.' 6
The vast majority of oil and gas facilities comply with Texas air pollution regulations through operation of a permit by rule. Separate
permits by rule exist for petroleum salt water disposal facilities, 7 oil
and gas production facilities, including compressors and flairs,'8 temporary oil and gas facilities,' 9 iron sponge gas treating units,2" and
pipeline metering, purging, and maintenance operations.21 Each permit by rule contains specific requirements that must be met, and genEnvtl. Prot. Agency and Supp. (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/assets/public/implementation/air/sip/dfw/TCEQResponse.pdf.
13. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 116.601, 116.710, 116.119, 106.351-.354, 106.355,
106.6(a) (2009).
14. Id. § 116.601.
15. Id. § 116.710.
16. See id. § 116.119.
17. See id. § 106.351.
18. See id. § 106.352.
19. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 106.353 (2009).
20. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 106.354 (2009).
21. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 106.355 (2009).
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erally sets emission limits beyond which the permit is inapplicable. It
should be noted that an owner or operator may certify and register
emission levels that exceed those generally provided in a permit by
rule in certain circumstances under section 106.6(a). 22 One commentator has noted that "[t]his process ... can also be used for some
activities that don't qualify for permits by rule to avoid federal permits, because the difference between the potential emissions and the
certified emissions may be sufficient to keep a source from being classified as a major source or a major modification. ' 23 Additionally, well
tests do not require an air permit because the action of testing the
productive capability of a well and similar activities do not qualify as
"facilities" under section 382.003(6) of the Texas Health and Safety
Code,24 and only a "facility" must be permitted. 5
IV.

OIL AND GAS DISPOSAL WELLS OR

How

DO WE

GET TO THE ELLENBERGER?

One of the more contentious interactions between people and oil
and gas activities in the Barnett Shale concerns the installation of injection wells for saltwater or other petroleum waste disposal near residential or commercial properties. So long as commercial disposal
wells were located in remote areas of the oil patch, neighboring landowners generally did not oppose or comment on proposed new permit
applications. Perhaps this helps explain why the administrative approval rate for applications in the latest year reported, fiscal 2006, was
approximately 80%.26 When the proposed well locations moved
closer to the city and developed residential and commercial properties, would-be neighbors took note and became aware of the regulatory framework that seemed to accommodate locations that some
viewed as problematic.
As mentioned above, a permit by rule governs the emission of air
pollutants by commercial saltwater disposal wells. 27 Railroad Commission Statewide Rule 9 governs disposal wells for saltwater and
other oil and gas wastes.2 8 The statutory basis for oil and gas related
disposal wells is section 27.051 of the Texas Water Code.29 Section
27.051(a) concerns the procedure followed by the TCEQ for consider22. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 106.6(a) (2009).
23. Robert T. Stewart, Compliance with Air Emissions Standards in the Oil & Gas

Industry, STATE

BAR OF TEXAS PROF. DEV. PROGRAM, 22ND ANNUAL ADVANCED
OIL, GAS & ENERGY RESOURCES LAW COURSE 5, 5 (2004).

24. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 382.003(6) (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2008).
25. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.110(a) (2009).

26. See Railroad Commission of Texas, Saltwater Disposal Wells Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about/faqs/saltwaterwells.php (last visited
July 20, 2009).
27. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 106.351 (2009).
28. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.9 (2004).
29. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.051 (Vernon 2008).
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ing permit applications involving commercial or municipal waste injection wells.3 ° Section 27.051(b) lists several factors the Railroad
Commission considers when acting on oil and gas waste disposal well
applications.3 1 These include whether: the use or installation of the
well will be in the public interest; the well will not damage any oil, gas,
or other mineral formation; the well, with proper safeguards, will be
protective of ground and surface water; and the applicant has satisfactory financial assurance to support its application.3 2
What constitutes "the public interest" in section 27.051(b) of the
Water Code is a vitally important question for people and businesses
located in proximity to the proposed commercial disposal wells and
for oil and gas producers and commercial disposal well operators.
Two recent court of appeals cases consider this question and illustrate
the administrative process involved in disposal well permitting and the
judicial hurdle that participants in the permitting process face once
the Railroad Commission grants the application.
In Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water and Popp v.
Railroad Commission of Texas (Texas Citizens),33 the Austin Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment that the Railroad Commission had not deprived disposal well permit opponents of their due
process rights in granting the permit, but remanded the case to the
Commission to more broadly consider the public interest as provided
in § 27.051(b) of the Water Code.3 4 In Texas Citizens, Pioneer Exploration applied to the Commission for a permit to convert a producing
well in Wise County to an oil and gas disposal well. Local residents,
including James Popp and others affiliated with the Texas Citizens
group, opposed the application.3 6 One of the main objections raised
by the opponents was the additional truck traffic that would accompany the commercial injection well.3 7 Opponents argued that the expanded traffic on narrow, winding roads would create a safety hazard
for pedestrians and children who often used the road."
Following a contested case hearing in which the examiners considered all evidence presented by all parties, the hearing examiners issued a proposal for decision that recommended granting the permit
application.3 9 The examiners expressly found that the development of
additional gas wells in the Barnett Shale necessitated expanded capac30. See Id. § 27.051(a).
31. Id. § 27.051(b).
32. Id.
33. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 254
S.W.3d 492 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. filed).
34. Id. at 494-95; See also TEX. WATER CODE. ANN. § 27.051(b).
35. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 254 S.W.3d at 495.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 498.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 496.
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ity for disposal of wastewater following fracing operations, and that
the proposed well would serve the public interest for that reason.40
The examiners also concluded that they and the Commission were
without jurisdiction to consider the opponents' objection to the proposed permit based on increased traffic and resulting public-safety
concerns. 41 The final order of the Commission adopted the examiners' findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted the permit
application. 4 The opponents exhausted their administrative remedies
without success and appealed to the trial court, which affirmed the
Commission's order.4 3
As in all appeals of a final decision from an administrative agency
like the Commission, the Austin Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission's order on a substantial evidence basis.44 Under this standard
of review, the court is constrained to affirm the administrative
agency's order if substantial evidence exists to support the decision.45
In such a case, "[t]he true test is not whether the agency reached the
correct conclusion, but whether some reasonable basis exists in the
record for the action taken by the agency. '46 As provided in section
2001.174(2) of the Texas Government Code,47 reversal or remand of
an order following a contested case hearing is required if the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (1) violated a constitutional or statutory provision; (2) exceeded the agency's statutory authority; (3) resulted from unlawful procedure; (4) resulted from other
legal error; (5) were not supported by substantial evidence based on a
review of the administrative record as a whole; or (6) were arbitrary
or capricious or resulted from an abuse of discretion.48
After reviewing the evidence and noting that the Commission expressly found that it was without jurisdiction to consider increased
traffic as part of its public interest analysis, the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that the permit opponents had received due process
in the permitting proceedings, but remanded the case to the Commission for failure to consider the increased traffic and public safety objections. 49 A reading of the majority and two concurring opinions
reveals that the court struggled with the question of exactly what constituted "the public interest" in a statutory setting such as § 27.051(b)
where the Legislature did not define the term or provide guidance on
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 499.
Id.
Id. at 496.
Id.
Id.
45. TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174 (Vernon 2008).
46. Tex. Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446,
452 (Tex. 1984).
47. § 2001.174(2).
48. Id.
49. Tex. Health Facilities Comm'n, 665 S.W.2d at 503.
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what factors should be considered.5" As Justice Pemberton wrote in
his concurrence, "[a]bout all that can be said with clarity regarding the
term "public interest" is that everyone is for it-at least according to
one's own perception of it."51 Likewise, Justice Waldrop observed in
his concurring opinion that "[d]eciding whether a new injection well is
a good idea includes the notion of deciding whether it is a good idea in
the location proposed. This may, under certain circumstances, implicate traffic-related issues and the impact an
52 injection well in the proposed location will have on those issues.
Remaining after the Texas Citizens decision was the question of
whether the Commission could satisfy its obligation to consider the
public interest by simply receiving evidence of increased traffic, public
safety concerns, or location objections along with traditional evidence
of expanded oil and gas waste necessities without stating that it was
without jurisdiction to consider the non-oil and gas industry considerations. The decision of the court in Berkley v. Railroad Commission
of Texas, answers this question in the affirmative.53
Like the permit opponents in Texas Citizens, the plaintiffs in Berkley were owners of land near a proposed saltwater injection well, this
time in Montague County, who unsuccessfully opposed the permit application before the Commission and in the trial court.54 Unlike their
Texas Citizens counterparts, however, the objectors in Berkley argued
that the Commission's granting of the permit allowed a trespass, unconstitutionally took their property without compensation, resulted
from a failure to follow proper procedures, and was based on insufficient evidence. 5 The Amarillo Court of Appeals overruled the property owners' arguments and affirmed the Commission's order.56 In so
doing, the court employed the substantial evidence standard: "we do
not re-weigh the evidence, see TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174
(Vernon 2008), but rather assess whether substantial evidence (i.e.
more than a scintilla) supported the ruling. '5 7 With reference to the
question of public interest, the court cited Texas Citizens for the proposition that "safety concerns are indicia that should be considered by
the Commission when assessing public interests. '58 At the administrative level in Berkley, the Commission had considered evidence offered by the opponents that additional trucks traveling to and from
50. Id. at 498-507.
51. Id. at 503 (Pemberton, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 506 (Waldrop, J., concurring).
53. Berkley v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 282 S.W.3d 240 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009,
no pet.).
54. Id. at 241-42.
55. Id. at 242.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S°W.2d 790, 792
(Tex. 1995)).

58. Id. at 244.
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the proposed well could cause public safety hazards and could damage
surrounding properties.5 9 In its findings, however, the Commission
concluded that the permit was in the public interest because of the
need for additional disposal capacity in the Barnett Shale Field, new
gas wells would require fracing that produced wastes that had to be
disposed of, new disposal wells would help reduce the disposal costs,
and the well would not damage productive formations.6" Although
the Commission did not discuss the public safety objections in its order, the Amarillo court concluded that "the presence of such evidence
alone does not permit us to overturn the decision if the latter nonetheless enjoys the support of substantial evidence." 6 Relying on the substantial evidence standard of review, the court continued that "we do
not decide whether the ruling was correct but rather if it was reasonable given the evidence and law. Nor are we entitled to re-weigh the
evidence. So, because evidence appears of record supporting the
Commission's
ruling and that ruling comports with the law, we cannot
62
alter it."
The Berkley court's discussion of the opponents' trespass and taking
objections to the proposed permit also bears mention. 63 Permit opponents sometimes assume that an administrative agency should not
grant a permit if the resulting activity will injure property at common
law or damage or take property in violation of article I, section 17, of
the Texas Constitution. In fact, the issue of whether a party can act
under a permit without incurring civil liability is a separate inquiry
from whether a permit should be issued. In denying the opponents'
objections to the permit on trespass and constitutional taking grounds,
the court in Berkley cited the opinion of the Austin Court of Appeals
in the well-written and learned, but unpublished, opinion in FPL
Farming Limited v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission,6 4 for the proposition that obtaining a permit for a disposal well
does not relieve its holder of civil duties or liability for harm caused by
exercise of the permit.6" As the Berkley court concluded, "[t]he situation is much like getting a driver's license. While some may think that
the license allows them to drive upon a neighbor's lawn, it does not.
The home owner may still undertake effort to protect his yard or recover for damages suffered. Nor does the license allow them to ignore
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 242-43.
64. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, No. 03-02-0477CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 1074 *15-16 (Tex. App.-Austin, Feb. 6, 2003, pet. denied) (memo. op. not designated for publication).
65. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.104 (Vernon 2008) ("[T]he fact that a person has a permit issued under [Chapter 47] does not relieve him from any civil liability"); 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 305.122(c) (2009) (indicating that a consolidated
permit does not authorize damage or injury to persons or property).
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other laws and restrictions whether related to or unrelated to
driving. "66

Given the level of interest in the Texas Citizens and Berkley decisions by the citizen opponents, the Commission, and amici curiae, the
Austin and Amarillo court opinions likely will not be the final word
on the scope of the Commission's consideration of public interest in
disposal well permit applications. Until the Texas Supreme Court decides the issue, permit applicants and opponents should not assume
that the scope of the Commission's review of permit applications is
limited to a narrow interpretation of public interest as was advanced
by the Commission in Texas Citizens. Instead, the determination will
likely involve a broad examination of all evidence presented that
might bear on the impact of the proposed permit on human health
and safety and the environment in addition to the traditional oil and
gas industry implications of the proposed well and the remaining factors listed in § 27.051(b) of the Water Code.
V.

COMMON LAW REMEDIES FOR OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES

If the statutory and administrative requirements for air and disposal
well permits are sometimes confusing and strange to lawyers who do
not practice in environmental law, the common law remedies available to aggrieved parties are familiar old favorites. Those remedies include negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, and intentional
torts. Two of the most commonly asserted causes of action for damages due to oil and gas activities that cause harm to property are trespass and nuisance.
Trespass to real property, simply stated, includes any entry by a person on another's property without consent.6 7 A party is entitled to at
least nominal damages for a trespass, even if no actual damages are
shown. 68 To recover damages, a claimant must show ownership or legal right of possession; physical, intentional, and voluntary entry by
the defendant on claimant's property; and injury to the claimant
caused by the entry.69 In a trespass action at common law, exemplary
damages could be recovered if there was sufficient evidence of willful,
wanton, malicious, or evil intent. 70 To recover exemplary damages
under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the claimant must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the harm for which exemplary damages are sought resulted from fraud, malice, or gross negli66. Berkley, 282 S.W.3d at 243.
67. Gen. Mills Rests., Inc. v. Tex. Wings, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 827, 833 (Tex. App.Dallas 2000, no pet.).
68. Id.
69. Wilen v. Falkenstein, 191 S.W.3d 791, 798 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet.
denied).
70. Teledyne Exploration Co. v. Klotz, 694 S.W.2d 109, 110-11 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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gence. 7 The jury must reach a unanimous verdict as to the amount of
exemplary damages to be awarded.7 2
Although the elements of trespass are easily understood, proving an
actionable trespass and keeping a jury award on appeal have not always been so simple. For instance, in a Wise County suit for contamination of groundwater alleged caused by oil and gas wells,
complaining landowners won the jury trial and a $200 million punitive
damage award in a case brought on theories of trespass, nuisance, negligence, violation of Railroad Commission statewide and field rules,
and fraud.73 On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment, holding that the great bulk of the landowners' claims
were time-barred and remaining
claims failed for lack of proper scien74
tific proof of causation.
In the recent well-publicized and long-awaited case of Coastal Oil &
Gas Corporation v. Garza Energy Trust,7 5 the Texas Supreme Court
held, among other things, that there was no cause of action for trespass arising from drainage of gas caused by subsurface fracing operations.7 6 Although Justice Willett would have held otherwise,7 7 the
court left open the possibility that fracing might give rise to a trespass
claim outside of the context of drainage. 78 In addition to the significant holding, the Garza opinion also confirms that the Texas Supreme
Court is conversant with horizontal oil and gas drilling, hydraulic fracing, gas production and related topics, and appears poised to consider
other questions raised by activities in and around the Barnett Shale.
As the Texas Supreme Court stated in Schneider National Carriers,
Incorporatedv. Bates,7 9 "a 'nuisance' is a condition that substantially
interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable
discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities. There is
no question that foul odors, dust, noise, and bright lights-if sufficiently extreme-may constitute a nuisance."8 Nuisances are either
temporary or permanent, and the cause of action for permanent nuisance accrues when injury first occurs or is discovered, while accrual
of temporary nuisances occurs upon each injury.8 A nuisance can
also be public or private. "A nuisance is public if it affects a community at large, or if it affects a place where the public have a right to and
71. TEX. Civ. PRc. & REM. CODE § 41.003(a)(1)-(3) (Vernon 2008).
72. Id. § 41.003(d).
73. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1997, pet. denied).
74. Id. at 437-44.
75. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id. at 30 (Willett, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 12 ("We need not decide the broader issue here.").
79. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004).
80. Id. at 269.
81. Id. at 270.
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do go, such as a park, street, or alley, and which nuisance necessarily
annoys, offends, or injures those who come within the scope of its
influence." 82 "A private nuisance is anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenemants [sic], or hereditaments of another;
that produces damages to but one or a few persons and cannot be said
to be public." 83

In the context of drilling, production, and completion of Barnett
Shale gas wells, disposal wells, and other appurtenant facilities, nuisance claims will likely be raised in future litigation. Although several

lawsuits have been filed claiming nuisance in connection with compressor stations, none of the cases has reached the appellate court
level. The blanket language of the Texas Supreme Court in Schneider,
however, would support a cause of action for odor, dust, noise,8 4 and

light pollution in the event of a serious, compelling set of facts.

One complaint voiced by some gas .well critics is the aesthetic damage to views of the horizon and rural vistas caused by oil and gas production facilities. The recent case of Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC,85
casts doubt on the viability of such claims. In Rankin, several people
and a corporation sued operators of a wind farm in southwest Taylor

County for injunctive relief and for public and private nuisance.8 6 The
operator filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the private

nuisance claim that alleged damages due to loss of view.8 7 The trial

court granted the motion as to that part of the nuisance claim, and the
remaining claims went to jury trial.88 Based on the verdict, the trial
court entered judgment against the plaintiffs.89
In affirming, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that Texas law

does not recognize a cause of action in nuisance for a lawful activity
on one's land (a wind farm in this case) that interferes with the views
of neighboring landowners.9 0 Although the Eastland court acknowl-

82. Soap Corp. of Am. v. Balis, 223 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing State v. Rabinowitz, 118 P. 1040, 1042 (1911)).
83. Id. (citing King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 957, 960 (5th Cir. 1946)
(applying Texas law)).
84. Schneider Nat. Carriers,Inc., 147 S.W.3d at 269; see also GTE Mobilnet of S.
Tex. Ltd. P'ship v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599, 616 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, pet. denied) (floodlights left on overnight and loud air conditioning constituted
nuisance); Lamesa Coop. Gin v. Peltier, 342 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (bright lights, loud noise, and dust, lint, and burrs produced by cotton gin constituted nuisance).
85. Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, pet.
denied).
86. Id. at 508.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 513; see also Shamburger v. Scheurrer, 198 S.W. 1069, 1071-72 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1917, no writ) (finding that a lumberyard in a residential neighborhood was not a nuisance just because it was "unsightly or disfigured, . . . not in a
proper or suitable condition, or ... unpleasant to the eye and a violation of the rules
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edged that the wind farm had impacted the plaintiffs and conceded
that "[ulnobstructed sunsets, panoramic landscapes, and starlit skies
have inspired countless artists and authors and have brought great
pleasure to those fortunate enough to live in scenic rural settings,"9
impacted vistas would not support a claim for nuisance.9 2
VI.

HANGING OUT OF COURT: THE EFFECT OF THE RAILROAD
COMMISSION'S EXCLUSIVE AND PRIMARY JURISDICTION
ON COMMON LAW CLAIMS

Those representing claimants and defendants in lawsuits asserting
common-law claims or violation of administrative rules involving oil
and gas subjects should also be aware that administrative-law principles may not prevent such claims from moving forward despite pending administrative proceedings.9 3
In the Discovery Operating case, an operator of an oil and gas lease
sued BP America, the operator of a neighboring lease, for damages
allegedly resulting from British Petroleum's (BP) use of injection
wells on its lease. 94 Discovery claimed that BP was liable for violating
its permits for the injection wells issued by the Railroad Commission,
for violating Commission rules and regulations, and for negligence,
negligence per se, and common law and statutory waste.95 BP successfully convinced the trial court to abate the action pending a determination from the Commission on whether BP violated any permit, rule,
or regulation. 96 In conditionally granting a writ of mandamus, the
Eastland Court of Appeals held that abatement was improper because
the Commission did not have exclusive or primary jurisdiction over
the claims asserted by Discovery. 97 Mandamus was available for review of the trial court order because Discovery had no adequate remedy through appeal. 98
In similar fashion, the Amarillo Court of Appeals in Apache determined that the Commission did not have exclusive or primary jurisdiction over common law claims for contamination of groundwater
of propriety and good taste"); Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Garrett, 276 S.W. 471, 474
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1925, no writ) ("Matters that annoy by being disagreeable,
unsightly, and undesirable are not nuisances simply because they may to some extent
affect the value of property.").
91. Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 512.
92. Id.
93. In re Discovery Operating, Inc., 216 S.W.3d 898, 905 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2007, mand. denied); In re Apache Corp., 61 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001,
orig. proceeding mand. denied).
94. In re Discovery Operating, 216 S.W.3d at 901.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 905.
98. Id.
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allegedly caused by oil and gas operations.99 In that case, the claimants alleged that Apache had polluted their groundwater through the
operation of oil and gas wells that leaked into aquifers used to irrigate
crops. 00 The claimants sought damages under theories of negligence,
negligence per se, trespass, intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress, nuisance, and strict liability."' Apache sought an order from
the trial court abating the suit until a pending Commission proceeding
could be concluded. 102 The trial court denied the request for abatement, and the court of appeals affirmed. 01 3 In denying Apache's
claims on appeal, the court concluded instead that the plaintiffs'
claims were those traditionally adjudicated by the courts, and no statute reserved such claims to the exclusive or primary jurisdiction of the
Commission.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As Barnett Shale gas exploration and development has increased
over the last few years, environmental issues relating to those activities likewise have gradually emerged. In the future, those matters involving air, water, and land impacts of oil and gas activities should
increase as the field matures and more long-term effects of the Barnett Shale can be gauged. Permitting and regulatory concerns will
necessarily follow additional production and development. Administrative and traditional civil disputes are likely to arise in the future as
the search for the source of the clean blue flame continues.
99. In re Apache Corp., 61 S.W.3d 432,433 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding, mand. denied).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 433-34.
103. Id. at 434.
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